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Abstract Dynamic epistemic logic describes the possible information-changing
actions available to individual agents, and their knowledge pre- and post conditions.
For example, public announcement logic describes actions in the form of public,
truthful announcements. However, little research so far has considered describing and
analysing rational choice between such actions, i.e., predicting what rational self-inter-
ested agents actually will or should do. Since the outcome of information exchange
ultimately depends on the actions chosen by all the agents in the system, and assuming
that agents have preferences over such outcomes, this is a game theoretic scenario.
This is, in our opinion, an interesting general research direction, combining logic and
game theory in the study of rational information exchange. In this article we take some
first steps in this direction: we consider the case where available actions are public
announcements, and where each agent has a (typically epistemic) goal formula that
she would like to become true. What will each agent announce? The truth of the goal
formula also depends on the announcements made by other agents. We analyse such
public announcement games.
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1 Introduction
Epistemic logic has been around since the 1960s (Hintikka 1962; von Wright 1951).
Initially, in this logic one could model the knowledge of a single agent only. Propo-
sitions like K p express that the agent knows p, i.e., in all indistinguishable states of
the Kripke model in which formulas are interpreted, p must be true. Multi-agent epi-
stemic logic became widely studied since the early 1980s, two influential overviews
of this period are (Fagin et al. 1995; Meyer and van der Hoek 1995). Correspondingly
we shift from K p to Ki p, for ‘agent i knows p’. The multi-agent direction made it
possible to also introduce group epistemic operators, for general knowledge, common
knowledge, and distributed knowledge.
One of the most prominent recent developments of epistemic logic is dynamic
epistemic logic (del); see (van Ditmarsch et al. 2007) for an overview. Information
is communicated, so knowledge is by no means static. del is an umbrella term for
extensions of epistemic logic with dynamic operators for formalising reasoning about
information change.
The idea of combining epistemic logic and dynamic modal logic (Harel 1984; Harel
et al. 2000) (developed in the 1980s as a specification language to reason about the
correctness and behaviour of computer programs) to model information change is due
to van Benthem (van Benthem 1989). The perhaps simplest dynamic epistemic logic
is public announcement logic (pal) (Plaza 1989; Gerbrandy and Groeneveld 1997),
which makes epistemic logic dynamic by adding modal operators 〈ψ〉, where ψ is
a formula. The intended meaning of 〈ψ〉ϕ is that after ψ is truthfully and publicly
announced, ϕ will be true. More sophisticated and general frameworks model more
complex events than public announcements, such as card showing actions, where dif-
ferent agents have different perspectives on the action (one agent can see something
is going on while the others know exactly what is happening). Different approaches
have been developed by Baltag et al. (1998); Gerbrandy (1999); van Linder et al.
(1995); van Ditmarsch (2000) and many others. Further recent developments include
the incorporation of factual change into languages that express epistemic change (van
Benthem et al. 2006; van Ditmarsch et al. 2005), preference-based modelling of belief
revision with dynamic modal operators (Aucher 2003; van Ditmarsch 2005; Baltag
and Smets 2008; van Benthem and Liu 2007), the integration of dynamic epistemic
logics with temporal epistemic logics (van Benthem et al. 2009), and various forms of
quantification over propositional variables, as in Balbiani et al. (2008), Ågotnes and
van Ditmarsch (2008), and Ågotnes et al. (2010a).
While dynamic epistemic logic describes the possible information-changing actions
available to individual agents, and their knowledge pre- and post conditions, little
research so far has considered describing and analysing rational choice between such
actions, i.e., predicting what rational self-interested agents actually will do. Since the
outcome of information exchange ultimately depends on the actions chosen by all the
agents in the system, this is a game theoretic scenario.
The purpose of this paper is twofold.
First, we want to point to an interesting general research direction in the theory
of information change, combining logic and game theory by analysing del from a
game theoretic perspective; describing not only what can happen, as standard dynamic
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epistemic logics do, but also what will (or should) happen. There are many free
variables here:
− On the logic side, different types of actions: public announcements, private
announcements, general action models, etc.
− On the game theory side, different types of games and related frameworks: stra-
tegic games, extensive games, even social choice and mechanism design models.
− The representation of preferences. The question of rational action in a dynamic
epistemic logic framework presupposes preferences over (multi-agent) epistemic
states. Preference representation is currently an active research area in logic and
computer science. Examples of such representations include logical goal formu-
lae (Harrenstein et al. 2001), weighted formulae (Ieong and Shoham 2005; Lang
et al. 2006; Uckelman et al. 2009; Elkind et al. 2009), and CP-nets (Boutilier et al.
1999, 2003, 2004).
While various combinations of modal logic and game theory is currently an active
research area (van der Hoek and Pauly 2006), we are not aware of any works analysing
action (for example identifying equilibria) in del from a game theoretic perspective.
Second, we make some first steps, in analysing the perhaps simplest scenario:
− We assume that actions are public announcements,
− we look at strategic form games, and
− we represent preferences using logical goal formulae.
Thus, we consider situations where each agent has a goal, a typically epistemic for-
mula he or she would like to become true, and where the available actions are public
announcements. For example, Ann’s goal might be that Bill knows Ann’s secret mes-
sage (or hand of cards) without Cath knowing it. What will each agent announce,
assuming common knowledge of the situation? The truth value of the goal formula
typically depends on the announcements made by several agents, hence, again, the
game theoretic scenario.
In more detail, we want to model and analyse situations where:
− agents may have incomplete information about the world and about each others’
knowledge;
− agents have goals in the form of epistemic formulae, and agents’ goals are common
knowledge among all agents;
− each agent chooses an announcement to make, which she knows to be true;
− all agents choose their announcements simultaneously; and
− all agents act rationally, i.e., they try to obtain their goals.
What can we say about how such agents will, or should, act?
Games with imperfect information have of course been studied in game theory. For
the setting described above (strategic form games), the most relevant framework is
Bayesian games (Harsanyi 1968). Note that the games described above is a particu-
lar type of imperfect information games, where strategies and information available
in each state are closely interconnected (strategies, i.e., possible announcements, are
information).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we review the syntax
and semantics of public announcement logic, as well as some concepts from game
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theory. In Sect. 3 we introduce our model of epistemic goal structures (EGSs), and
associate a (pointed) public announcement game with each state in an EGS. A partic-
ularly interesting special case is when one or more of the goal formulae are positive
(essentially, only contains negation immediately preceding atomic propositions). In
Sect. 4 we discuss a relevant version of dominance in this setting. In Sect. 5 we discuss
the notion of Nash equilibrium, and, in particular, we introduce a way to view an EGS
as a single strategic game. These induced games are, in practice, Bayesian games, as
we observe in Sect. 7. We conclude in Sect. 8.
2 Background
2.1 Public announcement logic
The language Lpal of public announcement logic (pal) (Plaza 1989) over a set of
agents N = {1, . . . , n} and a set of primitive propositions  is defined as follows,
where i is an agent and p ∈ :
ϕ ::= p | Kiϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [ϕ]ϕ
We write 〈ϕ1〉ϕ2 resp. Kˆiϕ for the duals ¬[ϕ1]¬ϕ2 and ¬Ki¬ϕ, in addition to the
usual defined propositional connectives.
A Kripke structure or epistemic model over N and  is a tuple M = (S,∼1, . . . ,
∼n, V ) where S is a set of states, ∼i ⊆ S × S is an epistemic indistinguishability rela-
tion that is assumed to be an equivalence relation for each agent i , and V :  → 2S
maps primitive propositions to the states in which they are true. A pointed Kripke
structure is a pair (M, s) where s is a state in M . In this paper we will assume that
Kripke structures are finite. We also assume that Kripke structures are connected1—
this assumption is not really needed,2 but it makes the technical treatment easier.
We will sometimes use the notation [s]i for the s-equivalence class of agent i , i.e.,
[s]i = {t : s ∼i t}.
When M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) and M ′ = (S′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n, V ′) are both episte-
mic models over N and , S ⊆ S′ and each ∼i and V are the results of restricting
each ∼′i and V ′ to S, we say that M is a submodel of M ′. We will sometimes abuse
notation and write M ⊆ M ′ to mean that M is a submodel of M ′. Likewise, we some-
times abuse notation and treat a model M as its state space, writing, e.g., s ∈ M for
s ∈ S.
The interpretation of formulae in a pointed Kripke structure is defined as follows.
M, s |
 p iff p ∈ V (s)
M, s |
 Kiϕ iff for every t such that s ∼i t, M, t |
 ϕ
1 A finite Kripke structure is connected if every state is reachable from every other state via the indistin-
guishability relations. Formally: for every pair s, t ∈ S there is a sequence of agents i0, . . . , ik (k ≥ 0) and
states s0, . . . , sk+1 such that s j ∼i j s j+1 for any 0 ≤ j ≤ k and s0 = s and sk = t .
2 Every pointed Kripke structure is equivalent to a connected pointed Kripke structure, in the sense that
the same formulae are satisfied.
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M, s |
 ¬ϕ iff not M, s |
 ϕ
M, s |
 ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s |
 ϕ and M, s |
 ψ
M, s |
 [ϕ]ψ iff M, s |
 ϕ implies that M |ϕ, s |
 ψ
where
M |ϕ = (S′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n, V ′)
such that
S′ = {s′ ∈ S : M, s′ |
 ϕ},
∼′i =∼i ∩(S′ × S′) and
V ′(p) = V (p) ∩ S′.
The update of M by ϕ, M |ϕ, is the submodel of M obtained by removing states
where ϕ is false.
Observe that the interpretation of the dual public announcement operator is:
M, s |
 〈ϕ〉ψ iff M, s |
 ϕ and M |ϕ, s |
 ψ
We write M |
 ϕ to denote the fact that M, s |
 ϕ for every state s ∈ M .
The purely epistemic fragment of the language (i.e., formulae not containing public
announcement operators [ϕ]) is denoted Lel . It was already shown in Plaza’s original
publication on that logic (Plaza 1989) that the language of pal is no more expressive
than the purely epistemic fragment.
2.2 Strategic games
We very briefly review the notion of a strategic game and some related concepts from
game theory; see, e.g., (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994) for further details.
A strategic game is a triple G = 〈N , {Ai : i ∈ N }, {ui : i ∈ N }〉 where
− N is the finite set of players
− for each i ∈ N , Ai is the set of strategies (or actions) available to i.A = × j∈N A j
is the set of strategy profiles.
− for each i ∈ N , ui : A → R is the payoff function for i , mapping each strategy
profile to a number.
When (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A, the notation (a1, . . . , an)[ai/a′i ] stands for the profile wherein
strategy ai is replaced by a′i .
A strategy profile is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium if every strategy is the best
response of that agent to the strategies of the other agents, i.e., if the agent can not do
any better by choosing a different strategy given that the strategies of the other agents
are fixed. Formally, a profile (a1, . . . , an) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all
i ∈ N , for all a′i = ai , ui ((a1, . . . , an)[ai/a′i ]) ≤ ui (a1, . . . , an). In this paper we
are mostly interested in pure strategies, and by “Nash equilibrium” we will usually
implicitly mean the pure strategy variant.
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A strategy for an agent is weakly dominant if it is at least as good for that agent
as any other strategy, no matter which strategies the other agents choose.3 Formally,
a strategy ai for agent i is weakly dominant if and only if for all agents j , for all
a′j , ui (a′1, . . . , a′n) ≤ ui ((a′1, . . . , a′n)[a′i/ai ]). Clearly, a strategy profile where all the
strategies are weakly dominant is a Nash equilibrium.
Concepts and terminology relating to imperfect information games will be intro-
duced in Sect. 7.
3 Pointed public announcement games
Given n agents, an epistemic model M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) encodes their uncer-
tainty about facts and about each other. We also assume that goal formulae γ1, . . . , γn
express what the agents wish to achieve by their announcements, i.e., each agent i
wishes goal γi to be true.
Definition 1 (Epistemic Goal Structure) An epistemic goal structure (EGS) AG is
a tuple 〈M, γ1, . . . , γn〉 where M is an epistemic structure, and where γ1, . . . , γn ∈
Lpal . Formula γi is the goal for agent i . A pointed epistemic goal structure is a tuple
(AG, s) where s ∈ M .
In order to achieve their goals, an agent can choose between different truthful
announcements, and we assume that all agents make these announcements simul-
taneously.
It is now very natural to associate a strategic game with a pointed epistemic goal
structure: strategies, or actions, correspond to the individual announcements the agents
can choose between, and a goal is satisfied iff it is true after all the agents simulta-
neously make their chosen announcement.
Definition 2 (Pointed public announcement game, state game) The pointed public
announcement game (pointed PAG) G(AG, s) associated with state s ∈ M of episte-
mic goal structure AG = 〈M, γi , . . . , γn〉 is the strategic game defined by
− N = {1, . . . , n},
− Ai = {ϕi ∈ Lpal : M, s |
 Kiϕi },
− ui (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) =
{
1 if M, s |
 〈K1ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Knϕn〉γi
0 otherwise
A pointed public announcement game will also be referred to as a state game.
Like in Boolean games (Harrenstein 2004; Harrenstein et al. 2001), binary utilities
are implicit in these public announcement games; an agent’s goal is either satisfied or
not. In the definition of the payoff function an agent gets the value 1 iff her goal is
satisfied after the joint announcement.4
3 The literature differ in the definition of weakly dominant strategies. Another common definition in addi-
tion requires that the strategy is strictly better against at least one combination of actions by the other
agents.
4 Note that, given the definition of a strategy, this condition is equivalent to M, s |
 [K1ϕ1∧· · ·∧Knϕn ]γi .
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Note that every agent i always has at least one strategy available; announcing a
formula ϕ (e.g., a propositional tautology ) such that M |Kiϕ = M . We call such an
announcement a trivial announcement.
Sometimes, for convenience, we will identify (AG, s) with its associated pointed
PAG G(AG, s), and for example refer to a strategy or a Nash equilibrium of the pointed
epistemic goal structure.
For goal satisfaction we do not require that the agent actually knows that the goal
has been satisfied (that Kiγi is true) after the announcement; a goal for agent i is
allowed to take the form γi = Kiψi , but this is not required, and a fortiori, we do not
assume achievement of the goals to be common knowledge either. We therefore have
to assume an oracle to announce the outcome of the game in the general case.
Agents may have different strategies available in different states of the game. Note,
however, that we can also view an arbitrary formula ϕ ∈ Lpal as a strategy in any
state, as follows. In this view, the formula ϕ stands for the strategy of announcing
whether the agent knows ϕ. If, indeed the agent knows ϕ, ϕ stands for announcing
Kiϕ (i.e., the strategy ϕ). If she does not know ϕ, i.e. if ¬Kiϕ is true, then Ki¬Kiϕ
is also true (due to the requirement that the accessibility relations are equivalences),
and then ϕ stands for the announcement of Ki¬Kiϕ (i.e., the strategy ¬Kiϕ). This
view allows us to talk about strategies in arbitrary states. Formally, for any formula ϕ
and state s define ϕ(s) (the strategy denoted by ϕ in state s) as follows: ϕ(s) = ϕ if
M, s |
 Kiϕ;ϕ(s) = ¬Kiϕ otherwise.
Although by the definition there is an infinite number of different strategies (syn-
tactically different formulae true in the state), all (finite) epistemic goal structures
have only finitely many strategies that really are different for our purposes (pointed
public announcement games), since there can be only finitely many announcements
with different epistemic content. We define two strategies ϕ and ψ to be equivalent
for agent i in model M iff M |
 Kiϕ ↔ Kiψ . Note that equivalent strategies are
always available in the same state games, and in a given state game two equivalent
strategies can be substituted for each other in any strategy profile without changing
the payoff to any agent. Subject to that equivalence, the number of strategies for i is
a function of the number of its equivalence classes in the model M . From now on we
will assume that this identification of equivalent strategies is always made. In practice,
in examples etc., we will just choose one of the many equivalent (syntactic) formulae
to represent a strategy.
Proposition 3 (Counting strategies) If player i has m equivalence classes in M, the
number of (non-equivalent) strategies for i is 2m−1 in every state if M is bisimulation
contracted,5 and at most 2m−1 in the general case.
Proof Given that i has m equivalence classes, and that there are 2m different subsets
of a set of m elements, there are 2m unions of i-equivalence classes. Observe that the
denotation of any announcement made by player i must be such a union, as player i
5 Roughly speaking; the model does not contain two different logically equivalent states. Assuming that
the epistemic models we consider are bisimulation contracted would not be a restriction for our purposes:
every pointed epistemic model can be reduced to one which is bisimulation contracted and which has the
same logical theory and thus the same state games. See Appendix A for details.
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only announces what she knows to be true: her announcement has form Kiϕ. Con-
versely, if the model is bisimulation contracted, any such union is the denotation of
some announcement.6 How many of those unions contain a given actual state? This
number now is independent from that state. This is because for each such union of
i-equivalence classes, its complement on the domain is also a union of i-equivalence
classes; and any state should therefore be either in one or the other. In other words,
we are counting the different ways to partition the domain in two parts (a dichotomy)
such that the partition induced by player i is a refinement of that. Therefore there are
2m
2 = 2m−1 disjoint pairs of unions of i-equivalence classes. unionsq
Example 4 (Counting and choosing announcements) Consider the following formal
model of a situation: a two-player pointed EGS (〈M, γAnn, γBill〉, s), where M is the
following structure
•¬pB ,pAt
Ann •pB ,pAs Bill •pB ,¬pAu
and
γAnn = (K B pA ∨ K B¬pA) → (K A pB ∨ K A¬pB)
γBill = (K A pB ∨ K A¬pB) → (K B pA ∨ K B¬pA)
Ann’s goal is that Bill does not get to know whether pA is true unless Ann gets
to know whether pB is true, and similarly the other way around. s is the actual state
of the world. In that state, pA is true and Ann knows this, and the same for pB and
Bill. Ann does not know whether Bill already knows pA, and similarly Bill does
not know whether Ann already knows pB . Furthermore, Ann does not know whether
pB is true, but she knows that if pB is false then Bill already knows that pA is true,
and similarly for Bill.
In terms of Proposition 3, as both players have two equivalence classes in the above
example, they both have 22−1 = 2 different strategies. For example, Ann’s partition is
{t, s}, {u}. The four different unions of equivalence classes are ∅, {t, s}, {u}, {t, s, u}
and the two dichotomies are therefore {∅, {t, s, u}} and {{t, s}, {u}}. The first can be
identified with the strategy  (‘true’), as K A holds in {t, s, u}, and its negation
¬K A is equivalent to false and holds nowhere. The dichotomy {{t, s}, {u}} can be
associated with the strategy pA, as K A pA holds in s and t and its negation ¬K A pA
therefore in u. Similarly, the strategies for B are announcing  and announcing pB .
Example 5 (State game, Example 4 continued) As we saw in Example 4, in s each
agent can make two announcements with different information content, and the asso-
ciated state game can thus be seen as a 2 × 2 matrix. We use the following picture to
show that the game is associated with the point s:
6 Technically, the announcement is constructed as follows. For each of the, say k, equivalence classes not
in the union, let αi be the characteristic formula for one (arbitrarily chosen) of the states in that equivalence
class; the needed announcement is Ki¬(α1 ∨ · · · ∨αk ). See the proof of Lemma 7 for further details about
this technique.
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•¬pB ,pAt
Ann •pB ,pAs Bill


 •pB ,¬pAu
 pB
 11 10
pA 01 11
The figure above uses some notation we will use henceforth: Ann is assumed to be
the row player and Bill the column player and payoff is written xy where x is Ann’s
payoff and y is Bill’s.
The game has two Nash equilibria: either both agents announce their private infor-
mation, or neither says anything informative.
So a pointed PAG models the type of situation described in Sect. 1, and it might be
tempting at first sight to view a pointed PAG similarly to a Boolean game (Harrenstein
2004), and use the game theoretic tool chest to define rational outcomes based on the
state game. For example, in Example 5 we identified two Nash equilibria in the state
game. However, observe that in state s neither agent knows that the state actually is s—
and thus they do not know what the state game is they are playing! It is a fundamental
assumption behind solution concepts such as the Nash equilibrium that the strategic
game is common knowledge. Since the state game is not common knowledge among
the two agents, the identification of equilibria of the state game can therefore not be a
reliable method of identifying rational outcomes. Figure 1 illustrates the state games
associated with also the two other states of Example 5. Clearly, if the actual state is s,
the state game is not known by any of the players—in fact, they don’t even know all
the actions available to the other player. Indeed, while (pA, pB) is a Nash equilibrium
in the state game in s, it is not in the other state (t) which Ann considers possible—she
does not even know for certain that pB is a possible action for Bill. Anne’s knowledge
about the situation is imperfect, and she has to base a rational strategy on more than
just the state game for s. And the same holds for Bill.
Thus, the situations we are interested in can be modelled as a particular type of stra-
tegic games with imperfect information, where the strategies and information available
in each state are closely interconnected (strategies are information) and where the same
strategies are available in indiscernible states (but not necessarily in others). We now
go on to discuss some possible outcomes and solutions of such games. In Sect. 7 we
Fig. 1 A public announcement game consisting of three state games
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explain how standard models of strategic games with imperfect information,7 such as
Bayesian games (Harsanyi 1968), can be applied to this setting.
3.1 Positive goals
In this section we look more closely at a particular class of epistemic goal structures,
where agents have positive goals.
In general, there is a pointed epistemic goal structure corresponding to any strate-
gic game (with binary utilities), and state games can have zero, one or several Nash
equilibria. Restrictions on the form of the goals, however, can induce interesting game
theoretic properties of the corresponding state games.
A natural and interesting case is when the goals are positive formulae, henceforth
referred to as positive goals. The positive formulae are the following fragment of Lpal :
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Kiϕ | [ϕ]ϕ
where p ∈ . An example is K Aq ∨ K A¬q(Ann′s goal is to know whether q is
true). This notion of positive formulae is found in van Ditmarsch and Kooi (2006),
which is an extension of several such notions going back van Benthem (2002) who
observed that purely epistemic (without announcement operators) positive formulae
are preserved under submodels.
Theorem 6 (van Ditmarsch and Kooi 2006) If (M, s) is a pointed epistemic model
and M ′ is a submodel of M containing s, then for any positive formula ψ : M, s |

ψ ⇒ M ′, s |
 ψ .
For a general pointed epistemic goal structure, a maximal informative announce-
ment (MIA) of an agent i is a strategy ϕ such that for every strategy ψ, M |Kiϕ ⊆
M |Kiψ . We state some properties of MIAs.
Lemma 7
1. A maximal informative announcement always exists (for finite structures).
2. The maximal informative announcement is unique (up to equivalence of strate-
gies).
3. If α is the maximal informative announcement of agent i in (M, s) and ϕ, β are
arbitrary formulae such that M, s |
 ϕ∧Kiβ, then M |(ϕ∧Kiα) ⊆ M |(ϕ∧Kiβ).
4. If s ∼i t , then the maximal informative announcements of i in (M, s) and in
(M, t) are equivalent.
7 Our knowledge games can be seen as both incomplete information games and imperfect information
games. Taking the initial state of uncertainty for granted, all moves—namely announcements—are public
to all players: perfect information about game actions. From that perspective PAGs and apparently the
original Harsanyi perspective (as explained to us by Giacomo Bonanno) are incomplete information games.
On the other hand, the uncertain initial state of information can be seen as the result of a partially hidden
move of nature: imperfect information games.
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Proof Appendix B.
If an agent has a positive goal, then that agent has a weakly dominant strategy—
namely her maximal informative announcement.
Theorem 8 If the goal γi of agent i in a goal structure AG is positive, then the
maximal informative announcement of agent i is weakly dominant in the state game
G(AG, s) of any state s.
Proof For each agent i , let αi ∈ Lpal be the maximal informative announcement
for i in M, s. Assume that αi is not weakly dominant in G(AG, s). Then there
exist α′1, . . . , α′n such that ui (α′1, . . . , α′n) > ui (α′1, . . . , α′n)[α′i/αi ]. That means
that ui (α′1, . . . , α′n) = 1 and ui (α′1, . . . , α′n)[α′i/αi ] = 0, in other words that
M |∧ K jα′j , s |
 γi and M |∧ j =i K jα′j ∧ Kiαi , s |
 γi . But that contradicts Theo-
rem 6, since M |∧ j =i K jα′j ∧ Kiαi ⊆ M |∧ K jα′j by Lemma 7.3. unionsq
One consequence is that if all the goals are positive, the state game always has at
least one Nash equilibrium—the combination of maximal informative announcements.
Corollary 9 If AG = 〈M, γi , . . . , γn〉 is a goal structure with only positive goals,
then for every state s ∈ M, the strategy profile consisting of the maximal informative
announcement for each agent is a Nash equilibrium in the state game G(AG, s).
While the maximal informative announcements form a Nash equilibrium in every
state game when all goals are positive, note that different states may have different
maximal informative announcements. We now turn to the question of the agents’
knowledge about strategies and equilibria.
4 Weak dominance
Let us first consider weakly dominant (wd) strategies.
In order to discuss knowledge of properties such as weak dominance, recall that the
interpretation of the formal epistemic language in epistemic models relies on the idea
that an agent knows something iff it is true in all the states she considers possible. But
this idea is a general one, and does not only apply to propositions expressible in the
logical language but also, more informally, to other possible state-properties—such as
“there is a weakly dominant strategy for i”. For example, an agent i knows that there
exists a weakly dominant strategy for i iff “there is a weakly dominant strategy for i”
is true in all the states she considers possible.
It should be clear from the discussion in the previous section that there is a crucial
distinction, in a pointed PAG, between on the one hand:
− the existence of a strategy for an agent which is weakly dominant for that agent,
and on the other hand:
− the existence of a strategy for an agent which that agent knows is weakly dominant.
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This is because it might be the case that there is a strategy which is weakly dominant
in one of the states the agent considers possible, but not in another. For example, in
state t of the model in Fig. 1, pA is weakly dominant for Ann, but Ann does not know
this. Contrast this with the fact that  is also weakly dominant for Ann, but this Ann
knows (it is weakly dominant in all the states she considers possible). Furthermore,
 is also weakly dominant for Ann in the remaining state u, so even Bill knows
that  is weakly dominant for Ann, or rather,  is dominant throughout the entire
model. Knowledge of weakly dominant strategies is a natural solution concept for
PAGs. But another important distinction must be made; a distinction well known in
the knowledge and action literature (Jamroga and van der Hoek 2004; Jamroga and
Ågotnes 2006; Jamroga and Ågotnes 2007).
Definition 10 (De re/de dicto weak dominance) Given a pointed epistemic goal struc-
ture (〈M, γi , . . . , γn〉, s) and an agent i .
− i has a weakly dominant strategy de dicto iff for any state t such that s ∼i t, i has
a weakly dominant strategy in the state game of t .
− i has a weakly dominant strategy de re iff there is some strategy for i which is
weakly dominant in the state game of any state t such that s ∼i t .
− i has a global weakly dominant strategy de re iff there is some strategy for i which
is weakly dominant in the state game of any state t .
Clearly every global weakly dominant strategy de re is a weakly dominant strategy de
re, and every weakly dominant strategy de re is a weakly dominant strategy de dicto.
If an agent has a wd strategy de dicto, she knows that she has a wd strategy, i.e.,
she has a wd strategy in all states she considers possible, but she does not necessarily
know which strategy is dominant; it is not necessarily the same strategy that is dom-
inant in all the possible states. If she has a wd strategy de re, on the other hand, she
knows which strategy is dominant; the same strategy is dominant in all the states she
considers possible. If she has a global wd strategy de re, she does not even have to
know her state. For example, if this were about uncertainty of card ownership in a card
game, say, she can play her global strategy de re without looking at her cards!
In state s in the model in Fig. 1, Ann has a wd strategy de re, namely . Her other
strategy, pA, is not weakly dominant. The strategy  is also a global wd strategy de
re. An example where an agent has a wd strategy de dicto but not de re will be shown
in Example 21, later.
For positive goals, we have the following property.
Corollary 11 If the goal of an agent is positive, then that agent has a weakly dominant
strategy de re in any state.
Proof Follows from Theorem 8 and Lemma 7.4.
This shows that the case of positive goals is indeed significant: with a positive goal,
the agent always knows what to do.
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5 Nash equilibrium
5.1 Knowing that, knowing how
What about the Nash equilibrium? Clearly, we can have situations similar to the case
of weakly dominant strategies: there might be a Nash equilibrium without the agents
knowing it; the agents might know that there is a Nash equilibrium but not necessarily
know what it is (there might be different equilibria in different accessible states). How-
ever, what “knowing” means here is not as clear as in the case of dominant strategies
where knowledge of a single agent was needed. In the case of the Nash equilibrium
there are several agents involved. Group notions of knowledge, such everybody-knows,
distributed knowledge and common knowledge, have been studied in the context of the
de dicto/de re distinction before (Jamroga and van der Hoek 2004). For our purpose,
we argue that the proper type of group knowledge for knowing a Nash equilibrium
de re is common knowledge, since that is the assumption in game theory. Common
knowledge of an equilibrium among all agents corresponds to a common equilibrium
in all states of the model (since we assume connectedness). Thus, the existence of a
Nash equilibrium de re is a model property, rather than a pointed model property as
in the case of dominant strategies.
Definition 12 Given an epistemic goal structure AG, we say that there is a Nash equi-
librium de re if there exists a tuple of formulae, one for each agent, which constitutes
a Nash equilibrium in the state game of every state in the EGS.
However, it turns out that this solution concept is very limited, as the following
theorem shows.
Theorem 13 In any Nash equilibrium de re of an epistemic goal structure, every agent
chooses the trivial announcement.
Proof Assume otherwise; i.e., that 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉 is a Nash equilibrium de re and that
there is an agent i such that M |Kiϕi = M . That means that there is a state t ∈ S such
that M, t |
 Kiϕi for some i . But since 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉 is a Nash equilibrium de re then
ϕi must be a valid strategy for i in every state, including in t , and that means that it
must be the case that M, t |
 Kiϕi . A contradiction.
While the argument for the above theorem is easy, it amounts to an interesting
“impossibility result”: there can never be common knowledge of a Nash equilibrium
that does not consist of trivial announcements.
For example, in the EGS in Fig. 1, there is a Nash equilibrium de re, because the
strategy profile (,) is a Nash equilibrium in all the state games. An example where
there are Nash equilibria in all the state games but no Nash equilibrium de re will be
shown later (Example 21).
The proof of Theorem 13 in fact proves something stronger, namely that the only
strategy profile that is executable in every state game is 〈
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
, . . . ,〉. That means that
the corresponding result, that common knowledge is impossible for other profiles,
holds for any equilibrium concept and not only Nash equilibrium.
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5.2 Induced public announcement games
We have seen how we can associate a strategic game with each state in an epistemic
goal structure. The question we address in this section is: can we view an epistemic
goal structure as a single strategic game?
We propose the following definition. It can, under certain assumptions, in fact be
seen as a type of Bayesian games (Harsanyi 1968), as we discuss formally in Sect. 7.
Definition 14 Given an epistemic goal structure AG =〈M, γ1, . . . , γn〉 with M =
(S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ), the induced public announcement game G(AG) is defined as
follows:
− N = {1, . . . , n}
− Ai is the set of functions ai : S → Lpal with the following properties:
• Truthfulness: M, s |
 Ki a(s) for any s
• Uniformity: s ∼i t ⇒ ai (s) = ai (t)
Thus, a strategy ai ∈ Ai gives a possible announcement for each state, but always
the same announcement for indiscernible states (note that the same announce-
ments are always truthful in indiscernible states). Alternatively, ai can be seen as
a function mapping equivalence classes to announcements.
− The payoffs are defined as follows. For any state s in AG, let G(AG, s) =
(N , {Asi : i ∈ N }, {usi : i ∈ N }) be the state game associated with s (Def. 2).
Define, for any (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A1 × · · · × An :
ui (a1, . . . , an) =
∑
s∈S usi (a1(s), . . . , an(s))
|S|
For further reference, we call a strategy ai global iff there exists a formula ϕ ∈ Lpal
such that for any s ∈ S, ai (s) = ϕ(s)(ϕ(s) is defined in Sect. 3); i.e., ai is the strategy
of announcing “whether ϕ” throughout the model. The trivial global strategy is the
strategy a such that a(s) =  for any s.
As for pointed EGSs and state games, we shall sometimes implicitly view an EGS
AG implicitly as the game G(AG), and talk about its strategies, Nash equilibria, etc.
There are various important points to consider in the above definition.
Strategies in the induced game Consider agents Ann and Bill. Even though the cur-
rent state is a member of the equivalence class that Ann currently considers as possible
states, she might consider many possibilities for what Bill’s equivalence class might
be. Thus, she must take into account what Bill is likely to do in all of these circum-
stances. But Bill’s choice depends on the states he considers possible, and he may
consider a state possible that is not in Ann’s actual equivalence class. And so on. We
therefore have to take into account all reachable states, that is (because our model is
connected) all states in the model. This means that Ann has to know what Bill might
do in any of the states in the model, independent from her actual state, and simi-
larly for Bill. This explains why strategies are formulated as contingencies for every
state in the model, i.e., as functions from every state to a choice of strategy in that
state.
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Payoffs in the induced game Second, payoff is computed by taking the average over
all states in the model. It is clear that it does not suffice to look only in the current state,
as each agent also might consider other states possible. But why not, then, compute
an agent’s payoff by taking the average over all the states that that agent considers
possible, i.e., that agent’s equivalence class? We cannot, because the strategic game
must be common knowledge, in order for solution concepts such as the Nash equilib-
rium to make sense. In Example 5, if the actual state is t, Ann considers it possible
that Bill considers state u possible. If we only take the average over s and t for Ann, u
will not be taken into account: that would be irrational for Ann, as she know Bill to
be uncertain between s and u if s is the case. Averaging over all reachable states corre-
sponds to averaging over all states commonly considered possible (all states accessible
according to the accessibility relation for common knowledge). This is also the reason
that the induced game is not induced from a pointed EGS: the induced game would
be the same at all points. This is as it should be, since the game should be common
knowledge at any state. The computed payoffs are expected payoffs, not expected by a
particular agent in the game, but expected payoffs as computed by a common knower—
an agent whose knowledge is exactly the common knowledge among all agents in the
game.
Counting strategies in the induced game We observed that in the state game for (M, s)
a player i with m equivalence classes has 2m−1 strategies (assuming that the model
is bisimulation contracted). In the induced game we can also count the number of
strategies.
Proposition 15 (Number of strategies in the induced game) If player i has m equiv-
alence classes in a bisimulation contracted model M, the number of (non-equiva-
lent) strategies for i in the induced public announcement game is 2m2−m in every
state.
Proof In a given state the player now can choose any of her 2m−1 state game strat-
egies (Prop. 3). Given uniformity, this means that player i has that freedom for each
of her m equivalence classes. Of course, the action chosen in one equivalence class
does not have to be the action chosen in another equivalence class: if Ann knows
pA, she might want to announce , but if Ann knows ¬pA, she might not want
to announce  but instead prefer to announce ¬pA, etc. All these choices can be
made completely independently. The total number of strategies for the induced game
is therefore 2m−1 × · · · × 2m−1 (m times) which equals (2m−1)m = 2(m−1)·m=
2m2−m . unionsq
This delivers a staggering number of strategy profiles: ×i∈{1,...,n}2m2i −mi (where the
number of equivalence classes for player i is mi ). Given that the number of equiva-
lence classes is in the order of the number of states |M | of the model M , this gives us
O(2(|M|·|M|·n)) strategy profiles.
We will shortly explain the induced game further through an example. First, some
theoretical points.
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Proposition 16 If agent i has a weakly dominant strategy de re in G(AG, s) for every
state s in an EGS AG, then there is a weakly dominant strategy for i in the induced
game G(AG).
Proof A weakly dominant strategy a in the induced game is defined by, for any state
s, taking a(s) to be a wd strategy in the state game in s under the restriction that the
same strategy is chosen for all states in the same equivalence class (this is possible
because the agent has a strategy de re). a is truthful and uniform by definition. Wlog.
assume that there are only two agents, and that i = 1. Suppose that a is not weakly
dominant. Then there is some other strategy a′ for 1, and some strategy b for 2 such
that
∑
s∈M us1(a′(s), b(s))
|M | >
∑
s∈M us1(a(s), b(s))
|M |
Since payoffs are non-negative, this implies that us1(a′(s), b(s)) > us1(a(s), b(s)) for
some s. But then a(s) is not weakly dominant in the state game in s after all, which is
a contradiction. unionsq
This immediately follows for positive goals:
Corollary 17 If the goal of agent i is positive, then there is a weakly dominant strategy
for i in the induced game G(AG).
Proof Follows from Proposition 16 and Corollary 11.
Definition 18 A Nash Announcement Equilibrium (NAE) of an EGS is a Nash equi-
librium of the induced public announcement game.
Example 19 Let us continue Example 5. We construct the induced game as follows
(it is instructive to inspect the state games as illustrated in Fig. 1). Both Ann and Bill
have two equivalence classes. Thus, as observed in Proposition 15, they each have 4
strategies. The set AA of strategies for Ann contains the following:
− a1A : t, s → ; u → 
− a2A : t, s → ; u → ¬pA
− a3A : t, s → pA; u → 
− a4A : t, s → pA; u → ¬pA
AB (for Bill) is as follows:
− a1B : u, s → ; t → 
− a2B : u, s → ; t → ¬pB
− a3B : u, s → pB; t → 
− a4B : u, s → pB; t → ¬pB
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In order to compute the payoffs, we need to check the payoffs in the state games for
each state and combination of strategies. We have the following:
axA, a
y
B t s u
1, 1 01 11 10
1, 2 11 11 10
1, 3 01 10 10
1, 4 11 10 10
2, 1 01 11 11
2, 2 11 11 11
2, 3 01 10 11
2, 4 11 10 11
3, 1 01 01 10
3, 2 11 01 10
3, 3 01 11 10
3, 4 11 11 10
4, 1 01 01 11
4, 2 11 01 11
4, 3 01 11 11
4, 4 11 11 11
We get the following payoff matrix. We will henceforth write the payoffs without
dividing by the number of states, for ease of presentation (the equilibria do of course
not depend on this):
a1B a
2
B a
3
B a
4
B
a1A 22 32 21 31
a2A 23 33 22 32
a3A 12 22 22 32
a4A 13 23 23 33
The Nash equilibria are underlined. They can be described informally as follows:
(1,1) Both agents say nothing (informative), no matter what. (This is a global Nash
equilibrium.)
(1,2) Ann says nothing, but Bill says ¬pB if the state is t (which Bill can discern
from any other state) and nothing otherwise. Let us consider this in the case
that the current state is s. Ann knows that the actual state is either s or t , but
not which. Thus, in the equilibrium she will play  under the assumption that
Bill will play  if the actual state is s and ¬pA if the actual state is t . Actually,
Bill will play .
(2,1) Similarly to (1, 2), with Ann and Bill swapped.
(2,2) Ann says ¬pA if she knows it, i.e., if the state is u; otherwise she says nothing.
Similarly for Bill.
(3,3) Ann says pA if she knows it, i.e., if the state is in Ann’s equivalence class
{s, t}; otherwise she says nothing. Similarly for Bill.
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(3,4) Ann says pA if she knows it, and otherwise nothing; and Bill always plays
pB , i.e., he says pB if he knows it and ¬pB if he knows that.
(4,3) Similarly to (3, 4), for Ann and Bill swapped.
(4,4) Both agents say everything they know. This is also a global Nash equilibrium.
We can establish a connection to having a Nash equilibrium de re, similarly to
Proposition 16 for dominant strategies.
Proposition 20 If there exists a Nash equilibrium de re in an EGS, then the trivial
global strategy is an Nash announcement equilibrium.
Proof Assume wlog. that there are only two agents. Assume that there is a Nash
equilibrium de re; we know from Theorem 13 that (,) is a Nash equilibrium in
every state game. Let (a, b) be the strategy profile for the induced game such that
a(s) =  and b(s) =  for any s. Clearly, a and b are both uniform and truthful.
Suppose that (a, b) is not a Nash equilibrium in the induced game. Then there is a
better response a′ for one of the agents, again wlog. assume for agent 1. In other words,
there is a strategy a′ for agent 1 such that u1(a′, b) > u1(a, b). But this entails that
us1(a
′(s),) > us1(,) for some state s, and thus that there is a strategy z for agent
1 in the state game in s such that us1(z,) > us1(,)—which contradicts the fact
that (,) is a Nash equilibrium in the state game in s. unionsq
Proposition 20 does not hold in the other direction. A counter example is found in
Example 21.
Before we consider the relationship to Bayesian games, let us discuss some more
examples and observations.
6 Further illustrations
Example 21 Define an EGS AG as follows. Let the model be as in Example 5, but
change the goals as follows:
γAnn = (K B(pA ∧ pB) ∧ ¬K A pB) ∨ (K B(¬pB ∧ pA) ∧ Kˆ A Kˆ B¬pA)
∨(K A(pB ∧ ¬pA) ∧ Kˆ B Kˆ A¬pB)
γBill = (K A(pA ∧ pB) ∧ ¬K B pA) ∨ (K B(¬pB ∧ pA) ∧ Kˆ A Kˆ B¬pA)
∨(K A(pB ∧ ¬pA) ∧ Kˆ B Kˆ A¬pB)
Perhaps the reader finds these long formulae hard to read, but it suffices to trust that
they give the following state games:
•¬pB ,pAt
Ann



•pB ,pAs Bill


 •pB ,¬pAu



 ¬pB
 11 00
pA 00 00
 pB
 00 01
pA 10 00
 pB
 11 00
¬pA 00 00
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This EGS has some properties not found in the EGS in Example 5 (Fig. 1). First,
Ann has a weakly dominant strategy de dicto, but not de re, in the pointed EGS
(AG, s). The strategy pA is weakly dominant in s, but not in t . There is, how-
ever, another weakly dominant strategy in t , namely . Second, while every state
game has a Nash equilibrium, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium de re in
AG.
We get the following induced public announcement game, where the strategies are
as in Example 19:
a1B a
2
B a
3
B a
4
B
a1A 22 11 12 01
a2A 11 00 12 01
a3A 21 21 00 00
a4A 10 10 00 00
The Nash announcement equilibria are underlined. Let us consider the situation
in state s. There are several different Nash announcement equilibria, including:
all agents announce  in all states (including in s). Note that (,) is not a
Nash equilibrium in the state game in s. Another equilibrium is that both agents
play “down” (i.e., not ) in any state (also a Nash equilibrium in the state game
in s). Note that (a4A, a4B) is a NAE while for example (a3A, a4B) is not. If the
current state is s (or, from Ann’s perspective the current equivalence class is
{s, t} and from Bill’s perspective {s, u}), Ann will in fact do exactly the same if
she uses strategy a3A or a
4
A. However, since Bill does not know whether Ann’s
equivalence class is {s, t} or {u}, he must also consider what Ann does in u—
which is exactly what differentiates a3A and a
4
A. Thus, the distinction between
these two strategies is significant, even in a state (s) where they give the same
action.
Example 22 Let us consider a more regular and symmetric EGS than the ones dis-
cussed so far. The situation is similar to the one in Example 5, but now Ann knows that
Bill does not know pA, and similarly for Bill/Ann/pB . The situation is modelled
by the following goal formulae and Kripke structure. We have also shown the state
games.
γAnn = (K B pA ∨ K B¬pA) → (K A pB ∨ K A¬pB)
γBill = (K A pB ∨ K A¬pB) → (K B pA ∨ K B¬pA)
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 pB
 11 10
pA 01 11





 pB
 11 10
¬pA 01 11





•pA,pBs Bill
Ann
•¬pA,pBu
Ann
•pA,¬pBt
Bill •¬pA,¬pBv
 ¬pB
 11 10
pA 01 11




 ¬pB
 11 10
¬pA 01 11





Again, the induced game has four distinct strategies for each agent:
x axA a
x
B
1 s, t → ; u, v →  s, u → ; t, v → 
2 s, t → ; u, v → ¬pA s, u → ; t, v → ¬pB
3 s, t → pA; u, v →  s, u → pB; t, v → 
4 s, t → pA; u, v → ¬pA s, u → pB; t, v → ¬pB
The induced public announcement game (Nash equilibria underlined):
a1B a
2
B a
3
B a
4
B
a1A 44 42 42 40
a2A 24 33 33 42
a3A 24 33 33 42
a4A 04 24 24 44
The game has two Nash equilibria. The first is that both agents say nothing, in all
states. The strategies in this equilibrium are both dominant strategies. The second
equilibrium (a4A, a4B) is that both agents tell everything they know, in all states.
In Example 22 the Nash announcement equilibria are all “composed” of Nash equi-
libria in the state game, in the following sense: for every NAE (a, b) and every state
s, (a(s), b(s)) is a Nash equilibrium in the state game in s (albeit not all such composi-
tions of Nash equilibria in the state games are NAE in the example). Indeed, this is also
the case in Example 5. Is this a general property of PAGs? No, and a counter example
is found in Example 21: (a1A, a1B), because (a1A(s), a1B(s)) is not a Nash equilibrium
in the state game in s.
We continue by modelling public announcement games as Bayesian games.
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7 Public announcement games as Bayesian games
The most common model of strategic games with imperfect information is the
Bayesian game (Harsanyi 1968). Public announcement games can be modelled as
Bayesian games. In fact, as we now discuss in more detail, the notion of the induced
public announcement game introduced in Sect. 5.2 can be seen as an alternative formu-
lation of a certain class of Bayesian games, in the following sense: Nash equilibria of
the induced game are exactly the Nash equilibria of the Bayesian game (defined from
the EGS in a natural way). We now make this correspondence precise. The discussion
is somewhat technical, but the main message is: the construction of the induced game
in Sect. 5.2 is simply a variant of the construction used in the analysis of Bayesian
games.
In order to view epistemic game structures as Bayesian games, we must make some
additional assumptions, because EGSs do not contain all the information needed for
a Bayesian game:
− While an EGS describes equivalence classes of states, a Bayesian game in addition
gives a probability distribution over the states in an equivalence class. Here, we
will assume that an agent considers the states in an equivalence class with equal
probability.
− In a Bayesian game, it is assumed that players’ have preferences over lotteries
on the combination of strategy profiles and states. Here, we will assume that the
utilities (0/1) we assign to players in state games, given a state and an action pro-
file, represent the expected value of a Bernoulli payoff function (see, e.g., Osborne
2004).
There is also one assumption usually made about Bayesian games, which does not
hold for our games: it is usually assumed that a player has the same actions available
in every state. However, this is not an essential assumption.8
The following definition of a Bayesian games is from Osborne (2004) (only slightly
generalised to allow different actions in states receiving different signals).
A Bayesian game has the following components:
− N is the set of players;
−  is the finite set of states modelling the players’ uncertainty about each other;
and for each i ∈ N :
− Ti is the set of signals that may be observed by player i , and τi :  → Ti is the
signal function of player i ;
− for each ti ∈ Ti , Ai (ti ) is a set of strategies;
− for each signal ti∈Ti , there is a probability distribution over the states τ−1(ti )
consistent with the signal, modelling i’s beliefs. Pr(ω : ti ) gives the probability
of state ω given signal ti ;
− a Bernoulli payoff function ui over pairs of states and action profiles available in
the state, represents the player’s preferences.
8 The essential assumption is that the same actions are available in states receiving the same signal.
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Definition 23 Given an EGS 〈M, γ1, . . . , γn〉, where M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ), the
associated Bayesian game is defined as follows:
− N = {1, . . . , n};
−  = S;
− Ti = {[s]i : s ∈ S}, where [s]i = {t : s ∼i t}, i.e., Ti is the set of equivalence
classes for i ;
− τi (s) = [s]i ;
− Ai ([s]i ) = {ϕ : M, s |
 Kiϕ};
− Pr(s : [s]i ) = 1|[s]i | (the uniform distribution assumption made above);− ui (a1, . . . , an, s) = usi (a1, . . . , an), where usi is the payoff function of the state
game in s.
To compute Nash equilibria of a Bayesian game, an intermediary set of players
(i, ti ), for every player i ∈ N and signal ti ∈ Ti for that player, is employed. The
equilibria are then computed for the game with those virtual players. The payoffs for
the strategic game form derived from a Bayesian game are then computed using the
probability distribution (beliefs) and preferences. Formally, the Nash equilibrium of a
Bayesian game is defined as a Nash equilibrium of the following strategic game:
− N ′ = (i, ti ), where i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti ;
− Ai,ti = Ai (ti );
− ui,ti ({a j,t ′j : j ∈ N , t ′j ∈ Tj }) =
∑
ω∈ Pr(ω : ti )ui (a1, . . . , an, ω), where
ai = ai,ti .
For the purpose of computing equilibria of the induced public announcement game
we defined strategies somewhat differently, namely as total functions, required to be
uniform, from states to announcements by i , i.e. from states to ‘pointed’ strategies for
players i . The uniformity required was that different states in the same equivalence
class for i are assigned the same strategy ai , so in fact we can see a pure strategy in the
induced game as a function from, for each agent, equivalence classes for that agent
to her strategies in that class. In other words, as a function from, for each agent, sig-
nals to strategies. In this function to every signal can be assigned a different strategy.
Therefore, these strategy choices are completely independent from one another and
it therefore corresponds to playing the game for a set of players (i, ti ) instead, in the
Bayesian version.
Theorem 24 Given an epistemic goal structure, 〈a1, . . . , an〉 is a Nash equilibrium
in the induced public announcement game iff {ai,ti : i ∈ N , ti ∈ Ti }, with ai,ti = ai (s)
for some arbitrary s∈τ−1(ti ), is a Nash equilibrium in the associated Bayesian game.
Proof Appendix C.
In the above theorem, ai,ti is well defined since ai is uniform.
We leave it to the reader to construct the Bayesian game versions of the EGS
examples discussed earlier.
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8 Discussion
Epistemic goal structures naturally give rise to state games. We discussed properties of
state games such as their number of strategies. In this setting, there are several differ-
ent variants of notions such as weakly dominant strategies, corresponding to different
types of knowledge. It is our view that there is not merely one single “correct” variant,
but that all of them can be interesting in certain contexts. For example, even if an agent
does not have a weakly dominant strategy de re, it might be useful to know that she
has one de dicto. When it comes to the relationship between game theoretic properties
and properties of the goals, an interesting case is positive goals: if an agent’s goal is
positive, then not only is she guaranteed to have a weakly dominant strategy, but she
is also guaranteed to know that she does and to know which one it is. For the Nash
equilibrium, it turns out that for general epistemic goal structures (not necessarily
with positive goals) there can never be common knowledge of a Nash equilibrium
that does not consist of trivial announcements. When it comes to more general Nash
equilibria, the notion of an induced game we introduced can be seen as a variant of
Bayesian games, but our definition is less baroque and is perhaps more natural from
the perspective of logical semantics.
8.1 Related and future work
Boolean games The intimate connection between knowledge and strategies in public
announcement games distinguishes them from many other types of games. In Boolean
games (Harrenstein 2004; Harrenstein et al. 2001), each agent has a goal formula like
in PAGs, and each agent controls a set of primitive propositions which affects the
truth value of the goal formulas. In contrast, in PAGs an agent “controls” common
knowledge of any formula he or she knows. We have seen that we cannot simply view
a pointed PAG as Boolean type game, because the agents do not necessarily have
common knowledge about the game that is being played.
Question-answer games Consider a different game. Instead of players choosing what
to announce, players choose which questions to pose to another player, where the other
player is obliged to answer the question truthfully. Of course there are just as many
questions to be posed to player j as (truly) different announcements for player j to
make. And one variable in such a game could be that a player i whose turn it is may
choose another player j to ask a question to. We can already observe that, given such
a choice, the total number of strategies of the induced question-answer game is also
countable given some model M involving at least players i and j as initial parameters.
Instead of 2m2−m pure strategies for player i with m equivalence classes, we now have
2m j mi −mi pure strategies for player i asking player j a question, where player i has
mi equivalence classes and player j has m j equivalence classes. This we can see as
follows. There are 2m j −1 different dichotomies for player j (i.e. coarsening of player
j’s partition), and for each of mi different equivalence classes for the requesting player
i , she may choose one of those questions, therefore the total number of pure strategies
is (2m j −1)mi = 2m j mi−mi .
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This sort of question-answer game is defined as a knowledge game in van Ditmarsch
(2000) (see also van Ditmarsch 2002, 2004), for the more general case where the
question is public but the answer may be semi-public: the other players know what
the question is, but may only partially observe the answer. E.g., the question may
be to show a card only to the requesting player but there is common knowledge of
some card being shown; the alternatives are the different cards to be shown. From our
current perspective this is a subset of all different questions to be asked, namely only
those with singleton equivalence classes. An initial investigation into question-answer
games can be found in Ågotnes et al. (2010b), also based on van Benthem and Minica
(2009).
Further generalizations In future work we will also look at more fine grained goal
models which do not necessarily give binary payoffs, for example weighted formulae or
CP-nets. Also, we want to describe mixed equilibria for public announcement games.
Finally, we will model situations with sequential announcements by using extensive
form games. It is of course very common that agents make informative moves one after
the other, as in a dialogue. So such an analysis would be very relevant. Unfortunately,
it is considered much harder to compute equilibria for the extensive form.
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Appendix A: Bisimulations and Contractions
The notion of bisimulation for structural similarity is well known in modal logic. Here
we state the most basic definitions and some well known properties that we use in this
article; we refer to, e.g., Goranko and Otto (2007) for further details.
Let two epistemic models M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) and M ′ = (S′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n
, V ′) be given. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S′ is a bisimulation between M and
M ′ iff for all s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′ with (s, s′) ∈ R:
atoms for all p ∈  : s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p);
forth for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ S: if s ∼i t , then there is a t ′ ∈ S′ such that s′ ∼′i t ′
and (t, t ′) ∈ R;
back for all i ∈ N and all t ′ ∈ S′: if s′ ∼′i t ′, then there is a t ∈ S such that s ∼i t
and (t, t ′) ∈ R.
We write (M, s)↔(M ′, s′) to mean that there is a bisimulation between M and M ′
linking s and s′, and we then call the pointed epistemic models (M, s) and (M ′, s′)
bisimilar.
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Let Z M be the greatest bisimulation relation on M . Note that Z M is an equivalence
relation on S. For all s ∈ S, let ‖s‖ be the equivalence class of s modulo Z M . The
bisimulation contraction of M is the structure ‖M‖ = (S′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n, V ′) such that:
− S′ = S|Z M , i.e. the quotient of S modulo Z M
− ‖s‖ ∼′i ‖t‖ iff there exist v,w ∈ S such that s Z Mv, t Z Mw and v ∼i w− V ′(p) = V (p)|Z M
The following are well known and/or obvious:
− If (M, s)↔(M ′, s′), then for any formula ϕ, M, s |
 ϕ iff M ′, s′ |
 ϕ
− (M, s)↔(‖M‖, ‖s‖)
− If (‖M‖, ‖s‖)↔(‖M‖, ‖t‖) then ‖s‖ = ‖t‖ (the contraction contains no distinct
bisimilar states)
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 7
Proof Let M, s be a pointed epistemic model and i an agent.
1. First, we show that the statement holds when M is a bisimulation contraction (see
Appendix A). In that case, we construct the maximal informative announcement
(MIA) α as follows. Let αM,s,i be the characteristic formula for the i-modality
in (M, s). The characteristic formula has the property that (for finite structures
M) it is true also in (M, s′) iff (M, s) and (M, s′) are bisimilar; see Goranko and
Otto (2007) for details. We now use characteristic formulae to construct a for-
mula that is true exactly throughout the s-equivalence class for i as follows. Let
X = {s0, . . . , sk} ⊆ S(k ≥ 0) be such that s0 = s and [s0]i , . . . , [sk]i partitions
S; i.e., each s j is a representative of one of i’s equivalence classes. Let
α = ¬
∨
x∈X\{s0}
αM,x,i .
It is easy to see that
M |Kiα = [s]i . (1)
Formally: first, assume that t ∈ [s]i , and that M, t |
 Kiα. That means that there
is a t ′ ∈ [t]i such that M, t ′ |
 α, i.e., that M, t ′ |
 αM,s j ,i for some j > 0. By the
nature of the characteristic formula, that means that M, t ′ and M, s j are bisimilar.
But since t ′ ∈ [t]i = [s0]i that means that t ′ = s j , which contradicts the assump-
tion that M is a bisimulation contraction. Conversely, assume that t ∈ S and
t ∈ [s]i . It must be the case that t ∈ [s j ]i for some j > 0. Thus, M, t |
 αM,s j ,i ,
and it follows that M, t |
 α and thus by reflexivity that M, t |
 Kiα. Thus, (1)
holds.
From (1) it is clear that α is a MIA: first, M, s |
 Kiα. Second, assume that
M, s |
 Kiψ . If M |Kiα ⊆ M |Kiψ , then there is a t ∈ M |Kiα = [s]i such that
t ∈ M |Kiψ , which means that there is a t such that s ∼i t and M, t |
 Kiψ ,
which contradicts the assumption that M, s |
 Kiψ .
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Now, consider the case that M is not necessarily a bisimulation contraction. Let
‖M‖ be the bisimulation contraction of M (see Appendix A), and let α be the
MIA for i in (‖M‖, ‖s‖). We argue that α is also the MIA for i in (M, s). First,
M, s |
 Kiα since ‖M‖, ‖s‖ |
 Kiα and (‖M‖, ‖s‖) and (M, s) are bisim-
ilar. Second, let ψ be a formula such that M, s |
 Kiψ . We must show that
M |Kiα ⊆ M |Kiψ . Again by bisimilarity, we have that ‖M‖, ‖s‖ |
 Kiψ and
thus that ‖M‖|Kiα ⊆ ‖M‖|Kiψ by the fact that α is a MIA in (‖M‖, ‖s‖),
i.e., that {‖t‖ : ‖M‖, ‖t‖ |
 Kiα} ⊆ {‖t‖ : ‖M‖, ‖t‖ |
 Kiψ} which, by
bisimilarity, means that {‖t‖ : M, t |
 Kiα} ⊆ {‖t‖ : M, t |
 Kiψ}, i.e., that
{t : M, t |
 Kiα} ⊆ {t : M, t |
 Kiψ}. Thus, M |Kiα ⊆ M |Kiψ .
2. Let α and β both be MIAs, and let t be some state. If M, t |
 Kiα, then also
M, t |
 Kiβ by the fact that M |Kiα ⊆ M |Kiβ. Similarly with α and β switched.
Thus, M |
 Kiα ↔ Kiβ.
3. Assume otherwise; that M, t |
 ϕ ∧ Kiα and M, t |
 ϕ ∧ Kiβ. But that means
that M, t |
 Kiα and M, t |
 Kiβ, which contradicts the fact that Kiα is a MIA.
4. Let α be the MIA in s.M, s |
 Kiα implies that M, t |
 Kiα. If M, t |
 Kiψ for
some ψ , then also M, s |
 Kiψ , so M |Kiα ⊆ M |Kiψ by the fact that Kiα is a
MIA in M, s. Thus, Kiα is also a MIA in M, t .
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 24
Proof Let a1, . . . , an be given. We show that a1, . . . , an is not a NE in the induced
game iff {ai,ti : i ∈ N , ti ∈ Ti }(ai,ti = ai (s), s ∈ τ−1(ti )) is not a NE in the associated
Bayesian game.
{ai,ti : i ∈ N , ti ∈ Ti } is not a NE in the associated Bayesian game iff
there are j ∈ N , t j ∈ Tj , and a′j,t j ∈ A j,t j such that u j,t j ({ai,ti : i ∈
N , ti ∈ Ti }[a j,t j /a′j,t j ]) > u j,t j ({ai,ti : i ∈ N , ti ∈ Ti }) iff
∑
s∈S Pr(s :
t j )usj ((a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn )[a j,t j /a′j,t j ]) >
∑
s∈S Pr(s : t j )usj (a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn ) iff, since
Pr(s : t j ) = 0 when s ∈ t j ,∑s∈t j Pr(s : t j )usj ((a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn )[a j,t j /a′j,t j ]) >∑
s∈t j Pr(s : t j )usj (a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn ) iff
∑
s∈t j
1
|t j |u
s
j ((a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn )[a j,t j /a′j,t j ]) >∑
s∈t j
1
|t j |u
s
j (a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn ) iff
1
|t j |
∑
s∈t j u
s
j ((a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn )[a j,t j /a′j,t j ]) > 1|t j |∑
s∈t j u
s
j (a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn ) iff
∑
s∈t j
usj ((a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn )[a j,t j /a′j,t j ]) >
∑
s∈t j
usj (a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn ) (2)
On the other hand, a1, . . . , an is not a NE in the induced game iff there are j ∈ N
and a′j such that
∑
s∈S
usj ((a1(s),...,an(s))[a j (s)/a′j (s)])
|S| >
∑
s∈S usj (a1(s),...,an(s))
|S| iff
∑
s∈S
usj ((a1(s), . . . , an(s))[a j (s)/a′j (s)]) >
∑
s∈S
usj (a1(s), . . . , an(s)) (3)
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First, let j and a′j be such that (3) holds. There must be at least one s′ ∈ S such
that
∑
s∈[s′] j u
s
j ((a1(s), . . . , an(s))[a j (s)/a′j (s)]) >
∑
s∈[s′] j u
s
j (a1(s), . . . , an(s))
(otherwise is a contradiction of (3)). Now (2) holds by taking t j = [s′] j , and
a′j,t j = a′j (s′). Thus, (3) implies (2).
Second, let j, t j and a′j,t j be such that (2) holds. Define a′j as follows:
a′j (s) =
{
a′j,t j if s ∈ t j
a j (s) otherwise
We have that
∑
s∈S usj ((a1(s), . . . , an(s))[a j (s)/a′j (s)]) =
∑
s∈t j u
s
j ((a1(s), . . . , an
(s))[a j (s)/a′j (s)]) +
∑
s∈S\t j u
s
j ((a1(s), . . . , an(s))[a j (s)/a′j (s)]) =
∑
s∈t j u
s
j
((a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn )[a j,t j /a′j,t j ])+
∑
s∈S\t j u
s
j (a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn ) which, by (2), is greater
than
∑
s∈t j u
s
j (a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn ) +
∑
s∈S\t j u
s
j (a1,t1 , . . . , an,tn ) =
∑
s∈S usj (a1,t1 , . . . ,
an,tn ) =
∑
s∈S usj (a1(s), . . . , an(s)), and thus (3) holds. Thus, (3) implies (2).
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